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BASIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PATTERN IN
VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES
INTRODUCTION
The concept of Variable Interest Entities (“VIE”) originated from United
States accounting principles. For recent decades, Chinese entrepreneurs
borrowed the concept of VIE to develop their own businesses under the
Chinese government’s special regulatory environment.1 Currently, the foreign
direct investment market is not completely open to foreign investors.2 Many
foreign investors are not permitted to invest in prohibited industries, and there
are also restrictions on the percentage of foreign shares allowed in a domestic
company.3 For the purpose of attracting foreign investors and circumventing
restrictions on foreign direct investment, the VIE structure is widely used by
Chinese companies to enter foreign capital markets; the same is also true of
foreign companies attempting to obtain control over Chinese companies.4 The
most recent and pertinent case arose in 2014 regarding Alibaba’s utilization of
VIE to issue stock in the New York Stock Exchange and successfully connect
its United States’ entity with Chinese-domestic business.5 Understanding how
VIEs’ structure achieves the goal of controlling the desired domestic company
and what are the differences in its corporate governance in comparison to
traditional United States governance methods is important. This comment will
parse through these questions and provide a brief analysis under both historic
and current regulation trends.

1

Mengwei Ma, The Perils and Prospects of China’s Variable Interest Entities: Unraveling the Murky
Rules and the Institutional Challenges Posed, 43 H.K. L.J. 1061, 1064 (2013).
2 See Xianwu Zeng & Lihui Bai, Variable Interest Entity Structure in China, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/02/articles/corporate/foreign-investment/variable-interest-entitystructure-in-china/.
3 See Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu (2011 Nian Xiuding) (外商投资产业指导目录(2011年修
订)) [Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended in 2011)] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce & Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Dec. 24, 2011, effective Jan. 30, 2012) MINISTRY
COM. CHINA (Feb. 21, 2012, 7:51 PM), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/2012
0308027837.shtml.
4 Zeng & Bai, supra note 2.
5 Gregory J. Millan, Alibaba’s IPO Puts VIE Structure in the Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014,
9:46
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/09/22/alibabas-ipo-puts-vie-structure-in-thespotlight/.
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I. VIE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONTRACTS
The structure of a VIE functions to circumvent the heavy restrictions set by
the Chinese government on foreign ownership and enables the companies to be
listed on the overseas stock market.6 Typically, there are four parties under a
VIE structure: (1) a company listed on the overseas stock market (“ListCo”),
which owns (2) a wholly foreign-owned company (“WFOE”); (3) a Chinese
domestic company which operates the substantive business (“OpCo”), the VIE
itself; and (4) Chinese owners of the OpCo/VIE.7 The OpCo is the company
holding the prerequisite license to conduct business in the industry, barring or
restricting foreign investors, and generating value from its operation of the
business.8 On the other hand, the WFOE is basically a shell company holding a
license allowing it to conduct consulting business with OpCo, as its only
client.9 The owners of the OpCo are usually the founders who retain majority
ownership in the substantive business.10
With the parties being identified and duly organized, the essential part of
the VIE structure comes into play: the contractual arrangement. Generally, in
lieu of equity interests, the pivotal contractual arrangement constitutes the
structural core between the WFOE and the OpCo.11 The primary purpose of
this contract is to transfer the OpCo’s profits to the shell WFOE as the
former’s primary beneficiary in the form of fees and royalties,12 while also
providing de facto control over the OpCo.13 The WFOE and even the ListCo
can be viewed as shareholders of the OpCo, demanding returns or “dividends”
on their investment.14 The legal majority shareholders, as well as the founder
and effective controller of the OpCo,15 are akin to directors and managers of a
corporation because both control the operation of the invested business, and

6 Kenneth Kan, Alibaba and the Variable-Interest Entity, MKT. MOGUL (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://themarketmogul.com/alibaba-and-the-variable-interest-entity/.
7 See Li Guo, Chinese Style VIE: Continuing to Sneak Under Smog?, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569, 577–
78 (2014); Serena Y. Shi, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities
Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265,
1277–78 (2014); Ma, supra note 1, at 1063–64.
8 Guo, supra note 7, at 578.
9 Id. at 577.
10 David Roberts & Thomas Hall, VIE Structures in China: What You Need to Know, O’MELVENY &
MYERS LLP 1, 2 (Oct. 2011), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6963/TICL_-_VIE_Structures_in_China.pdf.
11 Kan, supra note 6.
12 Id.
13 Ma, supra note 1, at 1063.
14 Ma, supra note 1, at 1068.
15 Roberts & Hall, supra note 10.
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foreign investors’ interests are largely dependent on the owners’ management
and operation.16 Under the effective corporate governance mechanism, Chinese
owners are expected to owe fiduciary duties to the foreign investors. This is
not always the case; the current uncertainty of VIEs’ legal status and the
absence of clear legal resort once the contracts are breached essentially render
the interest of ListCo and WFOE at the mercy of the Chinese owners.17
Regardless of the risks posed by regulatory uncertainty, it is still necessary to
recognize what function these contracts play in VIE’s corporate governance.
A. Call Option Agreements
The Call Option Agreement grants the WFOE the right to purchase the
OpCo’s shares from its owners through one or a series of transactions.18 The
purchase price is predetermined and typically set as “the lowest permissible
price under the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) law.”19 The WFOE will
have difficulty exercising this right if there are still prohibitions or strict
restrictions on the foreign investment in the OpCo’s industry.20
In lieu of recent events, such as the newly drafted Foreign Investment Law
by China’s Ministry of Commerce21 and the relaxation on foreign investment
in previously restricted industries,22 such call-option rights might be
substantiated in the future. The newly drafted law has been interpreted to
indicate that so long as the effective controllers of the VIE are Chinese
nationals, the existing VIE in the restricted industries will survive.23 Able to
acquire up to one hundred percent of the shares in an e-commerce business,24
the WFOE can effectively exercise its rights to purchase shares in the OpCo
16

See, e.g., Shi, supra note 7, at 1292.
See id. at 1291–94 (discussing the notion that misalignment of interests can prompt Chinese owners to
walk away with important interests in the VIE but foreign investors are limited in pursing recovery); see also
Guo, supra note 7, at 584.
18 See Guo, supra note 8; Roberts & Hall, supra note 10.
19 Id.
20 Guo, supra note 14.
21 Major Tian, What’s Next for the Variable Interest Entity Structure?, CKGSB KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 5,
2015), http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2015/02/05/finance-and-investment/whats-next-for-the-variable-interestentity-structure/.
22 See Daniel Chan & Peng Tao, China Removes Foreign Investment Cap on E-commerce Business in the
Shanghai Free Trade Zone, DLA Piper (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/china/insights/
publications/2015/01/china-removes-foreign-investment-cap/; Karen Ip, Damien Bailey & James Gong, New
MIIT Measures to Lift Restriction on Foreign Ownership of E-commerce Companies, Lexology (June 29,
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9d7a72a3-2b37-4966-a7f3-9fd42bc70070.
23 Tian, supra note 21.
24 Ip, Bailey & Gong, supra note 22.
17
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without worry of it being invalidated later. This expectation means that once
the foreign investors are capable and willing to exercise purchase rights under
the Call Option Agreements, foreign investors can effectively gain control over
the company and even prevent Chinese owners from manipulating business
operations or triggering a management change resembling a takeover.
B. Loan Agreements, Services Agreements & Equity Pledge Agreements
Loan agreements, services agreements, and equity pledge agreements go
hand-in-hand.25 The loan agreements between Chinese owners and the WFOE
act as the main investment; the former shall repay the latter out of the OpCo
profits.26 The consulting services agreement or functionally equivalent
contracts, such as know-how or trademark licensing contracts, disguise WFOE
profits as fees and royalties.27 On the other hand, equity interests of the OpCo
are viewed as security for the loan and other compliance components of the
VIE arrangements.28
In theory, managers of a corporation only owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders as the residual claimants of the corporate value29 and creditors of
the corporation. In the case of a WFOE , shareholders can require stringent
covenants in the loan agreement such as limits on repayment methods and
acceleration clauses to enforce the VIE structure as a whole.30 By using debt,
agency costs are reduced through various monitoring and bonding
mechanisms.31 The effectiveness of these contractual provisions is predicated
by the ability to enforce such agreements. The underlying contract might be
rendered unenforceable by PRC courts if it is viewed as “concealing illegal
intentions with a lawful form.”32 Under the current regulatory trend, while
possessing interests in a certain industry by foreign investors may not continue
to be viewed as “illegal intentions,” contractual provisions are still limited in

25

See Guo, supra note 8; Ma, supra note 1, at 1067–68.
Id.
27 Ma, supra note 1, at 1067.
28 Ma, supra note 1, at 1067.
29 Leo E. Strine, Jr, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS.
LAW. 1, 8 (2010).
30 Roberts & Hall, supra note 10, at 3.
31 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334 (1976).
32 Ma, supra note 1, at 1070.
26
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their ability to create change at the board and management levels.33 The most
high-profile case echoing these concerns is the dispute between Alibaba and
Yahoo, regarding the split of Alipay from its offshore holding company.
Yahoo, a major investor of Alibaba’s ListCo, could do nothing but reach a
settlement in that instance.34
C. Voting Rights Agreements or Power of Attorney Proxy
It is difficult to monitor important corporate decisions of the OpCo by
either the WFOE or the ListCo. While it is possible that parties would manage
to agree on assigning to the WFOE all of the usual shareholder rights,
including voting, attending shareholder meetings, and acting as necessary to
execute the call option agreement, there are still governmental hurdles35 As
discussed, without the Chinese government’s confirmation on the legality of
foreign shares, there will always be a chance that corporate decisions will be
nullified. A proxy arrangement involving such a situation was recently held
unenforceable by the Supreme People’s Court.36
CONCLUSION
If the Chinese legal environment remains stagnant in restricting foreign
investment in selected industries, the VIE can only achieve a minor
improvement to corporate governance. ListCos can continue to try to maximize
financial arrangements without participating in any form of the decisionmaking process of VIE. As the PRC government starts to reduce restrictions, it
may appear unnecessary to set up a new VIE since foreign investors could
directly purchase equity interests in Chinese companies. Such liberalization

33 Edward Drew Dutton & Niping Wu, Investing in China: New Risks?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON
PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 3, 4 (Summer 2011), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/
2011/09/the%20private%20equity%20report/files/view%20private%20equity%20report/fileattachment/perepo
rtsummer2011.pdf.
34 Kaitlyn Johnson, Variable Interest Entities: Alibaba’s Regulatory Work-around to China’s Foreign
Investment Restrictions, 12 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 249, 255–56 (2015).
35 Guo, supra note 8, at 579.
36 See Ma, supra note 1 at 1069–70 (discussing that a Hong Kong ListCo’s request of enforcing a proxy
arrangement was refused by the Supreme People’s Court on the ground that the arrangement intended to
bypass China’s investment restrictions and was consequently invalid because it was “concealing illegal
intentions with a lawful form”).
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would affect the existing VIE by transforming contractual rights of WFOEs to
shareholders, thereby granting them ordinary corporate governance capability.
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